This PR contains the following updates: | Package | Change | Age | Adoption | Passing | Confidence | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | [Jinja2](https://redirect.github.com/pallets/jinja) ([changelog](https://jinja.palletsprojects.com/changes/)) | `==3.1.4` -> `==3.1.5` | [](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | [](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | [](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | [](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | | [jinja2](https://redirect.github.com/pallets/jinja) ([changelog](https://jinja.palletsprojects.com/changes/)) | `==3.1.4` -> `==3.1.5` | [](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | [](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | [](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | [](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) | ### GitHub Vulnerability Alerts #### [CVE-2024-56326](https://redirect.github.com/pallets/jinja/security/advisories/GHSA-q2x7-8rv6-6q7h) An oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment detects calls to `str.format` allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to `str.format` and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to store a reference to a malicious string's `format` method, then pass that to a filter that calls it. No such filters are built-in to Jinja, but could be present through custom filters in an application. After the fix, such indirect calls are also handled by the sandbox. #### [CVE-2024-56201](https://redirect.github.com/pallets/jinja/security/advisories/GHSA-gmj6-6f8f-6699) A bug in the Jinja compiler allows an attacker that controls both the content and filename of a template to execute arbitrary Python code, regardless of if Jinja's sandbox is used. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control both the filename and the contents of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates where the template author can also choose the template filename. --- ### Release Notes <details> <summary>pallets/jinja (Jinja2)</summary> ### [`v3.1.5`](https://redirect.github.com/pallets/jinja/blob/HEAD/CHANGES.rst#Version-315) [Compare Source](https://redirect.github.com/pallets/jinja/compare/3.1.4...3.1.5) Unreleased - Calling sync `render` for an async template uses `asyncio.run`. :pr:`1952` - Avoid unclosed `auto_aiter` warnings. :pr:`1960` - Return an `aclose`-able `AsyncGenerator` from `Template.generate_async`. :pr:`1960` - Avoid leaving `root_render_func()` unclosed in `Template.generate_async`. :pr:`1960` - Avoid leaving async generators unclosed in blocks, includes and extends. :pr:`1960` </details> --- ### Configuration 📅 **Schedule**: Branch creation - "" in timezone Etc/UTC, Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined). 🚦 **Automerge**: Enabled. ♻ **Rebasing**: Whenever PR is behind base branch, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox. 🔕 **Ignore**: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about these updates again. --- - [ ] <!-- rebase-check -->If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box --- This PR was generated by [Mend Renovate](https://mend.io/renovate/). View the [repository job log](https://developer.mend.io/github/canonical/snapcraft). <!--renovate-debug:eyJjcmVhdGVkSW5WZXIiOiIzOS44MC4wIiwidXBkYXRlZEluVmVyIjoiMzkuODAuMCIsInRhcmdldEJyYW5jaCI6ImhvdGZpeC84LjUiLCJsYWJlbHMiOlsiZGVwZW5kZW5jaWVzIl19-->